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INTERNAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

GAo

FROM:		EXTENSION	NO	112 #78-3603/1
IAD/TG			DATE	21 December 1978
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Chief, IAD/TG			HJS.	
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3. 				
Assistant Legislature				
4. Counsel				
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3603/1

21 December 1978

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Assistant Legislative Counsel
X1
FROM: [REDACTED]
IAD/TG
SUBJECT: GAO Draft Report on Terrorism

1. Our initial look at GAO's draft report indicates several areas concerning intelligence collection activity in which we believe the writers to be misinformed. For example, the points made on pages vi, 63, and 74 concerning constraints on collection on foreign domestic terrorist groups are clearly misleading. Part of this is the result of GAO's confusing of "covert operations," and their special requirements, with collection activity. Another such example is the comment on page 72 on differences in CIA and Defense collection. CIA's requirements procedure is indeed different, given our unique clandestine collection programs, but it is no less valid (or "formal") than DIA's.

2. NFAC/ORPA/IID [REDACTED] has been in touch with us and dropped off his annotated copy of the study. He indicated his office has a number of problems with the study, and certainly the NFAC copy is replete with questioning notes. 25X

3. Also of special note, the subject of a coordinated Executive Branch response was raised by the Department of Defense member at the 12 December session of the NSC/SCC Executive Committee on Terrorism. The Chairman, Ambassador Tony Quainton, has agreed to address this following the holidays. We understand that DOD, State, and others will probably postpone their response to the GAO until after that get-together.

4. In sum, both IAD/TG and NFAC/ORPA have problems with the paper which we would like to discuss with the GAO

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authors. However, we would like to postpone that session until after the NSC/SCC Executive Committee addresses the matter.



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FROM		EXTENSION	NO.	OLC #78-3603/1
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3. Assistant Legislature				<i>Re: oblation</i>
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110 #10 3603/1

21 December 1978

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X1 Assistant Legislative Counsel
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D R A F T

**DRAFT OF A
PROPOSED REPORT**

WHAT'S BEING DONE TO PROTECT THE U.S.
DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM?

NOTICE--THIS DRAFT RESTRICTED TO OFFICIAL USE

This document is a *draft* of a proposed report of the General Accounting Office. It was prepared by GAO's staff as a basis for obtaining advance review and comment by those having responsibilities concerning the subjects discussed in the draft. It has *not* been fully reviewed within GAO and is, therefore, subject to revision.

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**PREPARED
BY THE STAFF
OF THE
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE**

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ABBREVIATIONS

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DCM	Deputy Chief of Missions
GAO	General Accounting Office

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